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When Waddington coined the word “epigenetics” to describe
the mechanisms of phenotypic expression that are not due to
changes in genes, he paved the way for understanding the
wide assortment of inheritance mechanisms that have since
come to light. Non-genetic effects on inheritance are now
known to encompass much more than emergently heritable
patterns of DNA expression or parental transcription effects
on morphogenesis (West-Eberhard 2003). Cultural transmis-
sion and other forms of environmental manipulation that are
repeatably induced or learned from generation to generation,
collectively referred to as ecological niche construction, are
thought to constitute their own systems of non-genetic
inheritance (Sultan 2003). These environmental pathways
of non-genetic inheritance are not negligible contingencies of
normal reproduction and development, but rather are thought
to play a key role in the origin of life itself (Dyson 1986) and
in the construction of new levels of biological organization,
which is a common theme of major transitions in evolution-
ary history (Jablonka and Lamb 2006). Why is it then that
the “question of animal culture” persists in being a
controversial, unsolved puzzle?
The essays collected in the edited volume The Question
of Animal Culture do not directly touch on this large body
of research in evolutionary biology but present instead
research in psychology and ethology about what constitutes
uniquely human social behavior. This historical controversy
can be characterized as an iterated cycle of skepticism
expressed by experimental psychologists about non-human
animal abilities, driving field behaviorists to make stronger
cases for the complexity of their focal species’ behavior,
followed by experimental psychologists “raising the bar”
for what they consider uniquely human cognitive features
under the rubric of “culture.” The book’s editors, Kevin
Laland of the University of St. Andrews in Scotland and
Bennett Galef of McMaster University in Ontario, both
experimental psychologists by training, introduce the book’s
collection of essays with a brief history of this research into
non-human animal behavior in captivity and in the field. In
their introduction, they describe the knowledge gained from
early accounts of termite fishing in chimpanzees up through
recent studies of singing in humpback and sperm whales,
providing a brief but vivid outline useful for teachers of
biology, psychology, and anthropology.
Although none of the contributors are evolutionary
biologists, perhaps the most biologically oriented perspectives
in the collection are written by proponents of “niche
construction” and occur in Chapters 8 (Laland, Kendal, and
Kendal) and 13 (Sterelny). Niche construction is a generalized
description of a lineage’s modifications to the environment
that subsequently affect future generations of conspecifics and
ecological interactors, most notably by altering the parameters
of natural selection (Odling-Smee 2003). Culture is clearly an
example of niche construction, and in light of this, Laland,
Kendal, and Kendal attempt to change the framework of the
debate by arguing that “[a]nimal culture is much more than a
window onto human evolution” (p. 177). In fact, the
universality of niche construction implicates all species in a
certain kind of sociality insofar as parental effects are always
necessary to offspring fitness. Laland, Kendal, and Kendal
review the evolutionary effects of culture by describing that
not only does culture, like other forms of niche construction,
offer opportunities for adaptive behavior, but it can also
become an independent pathway for evolution that limits the
interconnection of individual organisms with the external
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environment. Citing examples of a variety of fish and birds,
as well as specific examples of human societies, Laland,
Kendal, and Kendal claim the pervasiveness of animal social
behavior as grounds for its intrinsic value to natural history
and evolutionary ecology, independently of whether non-
human animal cultural behaviors are evolutionarily homol-
ogous to or convergent with human culture.
Real conceptual progress is made in this direction
when Laland, Kendal, and Kendal in Chapter 8, and
Sterelny in Chapter 13, take issue with the current
diagnostic method for identifying culture in non-human
animals. The “ethnographic method” infers social learn-
ing, and thus culture, based on a method of elimination of
three factors: genetic, ecological, and individual learning.
Can these factors really be eliminated in practice? Laland,
Kendal, and Kendal think they cannot.
[W]e suspect that were the ethnographic approach to
be rigorously applied, it would reject most genuine
cases of culture. Correlations between behavioral and
ecological variables are expected because culture is a
source of adaptive behavior, which enables animals to
learn about and exploit environmental resources.
Similarly, cultural and genetic covariance is also
anticipated because animal learning is influenced by
evolved predispositions and aptitudes. (p. 185–186)
In support of their suspicion that genetic and ecological
factors may be important to the origin and inheritance of
social traditions, Laland, Kendal, and Kendal describe
woodpecker finches and New Caledonian crows that have
experimentally shown impressive tool fabrication without
any social opportunities to learn their skills, and chimpanzees
that alter their ant-dipping methods for different species of
ant. While Laland and colleagues nonetheless endorse the
definition of culture as social learning and prescribe more
focused methods for identifying it in the field, Sterelny offers
an extended exposition about why even this core concept is
inaccurate. Sterelny (following Fragaszy and Visalberghi
2001) states that “[i]t is very likely that much of [culture] is
hybrid learning: [animals] learn by trial-and-error exploration
in an environment structured by parental behavior and
perhaps with both their trials and their errors modified by
their parents’ actions.” (p. 295). Other modes of individual
learning and plasticity that may be included in this
description include a variety of associative and non-
associative mechanisms from habituation to conditioning
and imprinting. Needless to say, the approach of individual
and group plasticity is more amenable to the description of
ant, wasp, bryozoan, or siphonophore colonies than psycho-
logical mechanisms. Yet it will take nothing short of an
interdisciplinary renaissance to bridge the behavioral and
evolutionary sciences, and this book should be commended
for adding a few planks to that bridge.
It is ironic that The Question of Animal Culture does not
speak to a broader readership of biology students, consid-
ering that culture is a particularly salient and therefore
eminently teachable example of the importance of social
and other forms of environmental determination in devel-
opmental and evolutionary biology. As it stands, readers
with experience in biology are left to formulate for
themselves the developmental and evolutionary importance
of social and other environmental impacts on natural
variation in all species, beyond the psychological mecha-
nisms of large-bodied, charismatic vertebrates. While the
book is not explicitly focused on a particular audience, its
authors seem to speak most directly to each other, and
secondarily to a readership of behavioral scientists and the
general public. For students of human behavioral science
and students of general biology interested in learning and
other mechanisms of plasticity, I recommend instead
sharing excerpts from West-Eberhard’s (2003) large book,
Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, or the more
focused overview provided by a chapter entitled “Behavior
and Phenotypic Plasticity” in Pigliucci’s (2001) book,
Phenotypic Plasticity: Beyond Nature and Nurture.
Until “The Question” is answered and brought to bear
constructively on human behavioral science and the wider
comparative context of socio-ecological inheritance mech-
anisms in all species, this book is best served as a useful
compilation of historical perspectives for those directly
involved in the study of non-human animal psychology.
However, The Question of Animal Culture is not only a
trade book for researchers of non-human animal psychol-
ogy. It is also a suitably informative text for educated
members of the general public and for this purpose would
make an excellent read, both philosophically and for being
full of exciting examples of tool-use and other kinds of
cultural variation in some of the most popularly known
species on the globe.
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